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Six experiments examined the connections in memory between two stories describing the 
same action sequence. The action sequences represented script-like MOP structures such as 
eating at a restaurant, like those proposed by Schank (1982. Dynamic memory: A theory of 
reminding and learning in computers andpeople. New York: Cambridge University Press). 
In the experimental procedure, subjects read a long list of stories, and then, after reading all 
the stories, they were presented with a list of phrases for which they were required to make 
old/new recognition judgments. Connections among the stories in memory were examined 
with pairs of phrases placed in the test list such that a priming phrase immediately preceded 
a target phrase. When a priming phrase was from the same story as its target phrase, 
responses to the target were facilitated. When a priming phrase was from another story of 
the same MOP as the target, responses were facilitated only if the test phrases were related 
to the MOP; there was no significant facilitation if the test phrases were not related to the 
MOP. In the case where the phrases were related to the MOP, there was as much facilitation 
when the phrases were from different stories as when they were from the same story. These 
results are shown to contradict previously proposed models of memory for script-like se- 
quences, and a new, limited encoding, model is proposed. 8 1989 Academic PRSS, IX. 
Understanding how knowledge is repre- 
sented is a central goal of both Cognitive 
Psychology and Artificial Intelligence. In 
the 197Os, one approach to this problem 
was the use of schemas to represent the 
structures of particular situations (Min- 
sky’s 1975 frames, Rumelhart’s 1980 sche- 
mata, and Schank and Abelson’s 1977 
scripts). Schemas were intended to orga- 
nize the temporal structures of stories or 
the spatial structures of visual scenes. For 
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the reader of a story, a schema in memory 
would organize information as it was read, 
and it could also provide default values for 
specific actions or objects not presented ex- 
plicitly in the story. With these default val- 
ues, answers could be produced to ques- 
tions asked after the story was read, even 
when the required information was not pre- 
sented at input. In this way, schema theo- 
ries were presented as a solution to some of 
the problems of inference. 
As these models were developed, it soon 
became apparent that the original formula- 
tions of schemas were too rigid to provide a 
general solution to the problem of knowl- 
edge representation (Feldman, 1975; 
Schank, 1982). Knowledge structures need 
to be flexible; information to be encoded 
will not always fit an existing schema, so 
that modifications or conjunctions of exist- 
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ing schemas need to be used. Or, when an 
inappropriate schema is initially used, then 
partially processed information should be 
available for the next try. Schank (1982) has 
also argued that the first implementations 
of scripts or schemas were too specific and 
did not support learning or generalization 
across schemas. 
To overcome these kinds of problems, 
Schank (1982) has proposed a generaliza- 
tion of script theory, in which the units of 
analysis are called memory organization 
packets (MOPS). A MOP is a dynamically 
constructed structure that consists of a set 
of scenes directed towards the achievement 
of a goal. The MOP organizes the scenes, 
and the scenes contain specific information 
about actions. The “coloration” of a scene 
is the combination of general information 
about how actions in the scene are per- 
formed (e.g., how to pay) with the MOP 
context (e.g., paying the waitress at the 
table). The division between MOPS and 
scenes allows the information in scenes to 
be shared across MOPS. 
The movement toward a more flexible 
conception of schemas has led directly to 
consideration of how information from a 
schema used for encoding in one situation 
can become available for encoding in a re- 
lated situation (Schank, 1982). There are 
two obvious cases in which the need for 
cross retrieval of episodes arises. The first 
is when an incorrect schema is partially in- 
stantiated and some of the encoded infor- 
mation is needed for processing a new 
schema. The second is when information 
from one, previously instantiated, schema 
is used to guide understanding of a new set 
of information to be encoded with a similar 
schema. It is this second kind of cross re- 
trieval of information that is the primary 
focus of the experiments in this article. 
The experiments were designed to exam- 
ine the cross retrieval of schematic infor- 
mation by examining the effect of cross re- 
trieval on the representation of episodes in 
memory. Specifically, one result of cross 
retrieval, or “reminding,” might be that an 
episode currently being processed is con- 
nected in memory to another retrieved ep- 
isode. If one story led to retrieval of an- 
other story that was read earlier and shared 
the same MOP, then the two stories might 
be connected in memory, either directly or 
through the shared MOP. 
Seifert, McKoon, Abelson, and Ratcliff 
(1986) tested for such connections between 
stories using pairs of stories that shared the 
same theme, rather than the same schema 
or MOP. For example, one story was about 
a graduate student who was treated badly 
and decided to leave for another school; his 
first school finally promised to treat him 
better, but the student had already enrolled 
elsewhere. The story that shared the same 
theme was about a secretary engaged to her 
boss; when the boss avoided setting a wed- 
ding date, the secretary went on to marry 
someone else, despite a last minute plea 
from the boss. These two stories share the 
theme of “closing the barn door after the 
horse has bolted.” It might be predicted 
that if subjects read two stories with the 
same theme, then one story would remind 
them of the other, and the two stories 
would be connected together in memory 
(Schank, 1982; Dyer, 1983). To look for 
these connections, Seifert et al. (1986) used 
a priming task in which single sentences 
were presented for verification. On each 
trial of an experiment, two stories were pre- 
sented for reading, and then a list of test 
sentences was presented. The responses of 
interest occurred in the case where a test 
sentence representing the resolution of one 
story was immediately preceded in the test 
list by a sentence representing the resolu- 
tion of the other studied story. Priming (fa- 
cilitation in response time and/or accuracy) 
should have occurred if the stories shared 
the same theme, and if reminding during 
reading connected the resolution of one to 
the resolution of the other. However, no 
priming was observed between the two res- 
olutions, suggesting that reminding had not 
connected them together. Only when sub- 
jects were given specific instructions re- 
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quiring ratings of thematic relatedness be- 
tween the stories was priming obtained 
from one resolution to the other. 
The conclusion drawn from the Seifert et 
al. (1986) results was that thematic rela- 
tions between stories do not automatically 
lead to a reminding process that connects 
elements of one story to elements of an- 
other story. One possible explanation for 
the absence of connections is that remind- 
ing requires that stories have a greater 
amount of contextual semantic information 
in common than was the case in the stories 
used by Seifert et al. The experiments pre- 
sented in this article were designed to ex- 
tent the questions asked about thematic 
structures to stories that shared significant 
amounts of contextual semantic informa- 
tion. Whereas the stories used by Seifert et 
al. were based on general themes with in- 
tentionally dissimilar contexts (the grad 
student versus the secretary), the present 
studies used stories based on MOPS with 
overlapping information. In Table 1, the 
two stories share a MOP, going to the 
beach, and they also overlap almost com- 
TABLE 1 
MOP: GOING TO THE BEACH 
First story 
Linda decided to skip work on Thursday and go to the beach. At the beach, Linda found the parking 
lot to be surprisingly full for a weekday, but she eventually found a spot. The beach, too, was 
crowded, but Linda was still able to spread her towel in a dry place close to the water. Not wanting 
to get a sunburn, Linda put on some suntan lotion. After lying on her towel for some time, Linda 
was getting hot so she decided to take a dip, and dove into the refreshing water. After a short swim, 
Linda toweled off and packed up her things for the long walk to the car. 
Second story 
Because the sun was shining so brightly, Nancy decided to spend the day by the sea. When she had 
gotten to her favorite seaside spot, Nancy parked her car under a tree. Nancy walked quickly over 
the hot sand until she found an empty space where she could lay her blanket. Hoping to add some 
color to her pale skin, Nancy splashed on some baby oil. The sun was very strong, so Nancy decided 
to get up and go for a swim. Nancy slowly strolled out into the cool ocean. When she finally felt 
water-logged, she headed back to her blanket. She dried off for a while in the warm sun and then 
dressed for the trip home. 
Test phrases for the second story 
Condition 1, MOP-related prime from the same story 
MOP-related prime: found an empty space for her blanket. 
Target test phrase: slowly strolled out into the cool ocean. 
Condition 2, MOP-related prime from the other story with the same MOP 
MOP-related prime: spread her towel in a dry place. 
Target test phrase: slowly strolled out into the cool ocean. 
Condition 3, prime from another unrelated story: 
Unrelated prime: looked over the wine list and ordered chablis. 
Target test phrase: slowly strolled out into the cool ocean. 
Filler old (positive) test item 
parked her car under a tree. 
False test item 
decided to spend the day at the lake. 
Filler new (negative) test items 
had not started the research on time. 
eventually found some sources for the paper. 
loaded the books into a heavy backpack. 
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pletely in contextual semantic content. For 
example, in the context of going to the 
beach, putting on lotion and splashing on 
oil have a high degree of semantic overlap 
in the sense that the lexical items, while 
different, refer to the same action, and in 
the sense that they both refer to the same 
event (lubricate skin) in the going to the 
beach action sequence. The hypothesis mo- 
tivating the experiments was that this con- 
textual semantic overlap might support the 
establishment of connections or associa- 
tions between the stories. The experiments 
were designed to look for evidence of such 
associations by looking for priming be- 
tween actions of two stories that shared the 
same MOP. The procedure in the experi- 
ments was that subjects read a long list of 
stories, and then were given test phrases 
from those stories. This procedure is de- 
scribed in the next section, and a theoreti- 
cal preview of the results is given in the 
following section. 
EXPERIMENTALDESIGN 
Through a series of five experiments, the 
general procedure was the same: A list of 
about 40 stories was followed by a list of 
about 200 test phrases. Subjects read the 40 
stories one at a time, with each story fol- 
lowed by a single true/false test phrase (to 
keep the subjects attentive). The test items 
were phrases that expressed predicates 
only, rather than full sentences, so that sub- 
jects would not devote excessive attention 
to memorizing the names of all the charac- 
ters that appeared in the 40 stories. Among 
the 40 stories were pairs that shared the 
same MOP; the two stories of a pair were 
separated by at least 8 other unrelated sto- 
ries so that any observed reminding effects 
would be relatively long range. The 200 test 
items at the end of the experiment included 
phrases from the stories that were read (old 
items) and phrases from stories that the 
subjects had never read (new items); the 
subjects were instructed to decide whether 
each item was old or new. 
The test items of interest for the experi- 
mental designs were old items from the sto- 
ries the subjects had read. An item from 
one story of a MOP pair was designated the 
target. In some conditions, the immediately 
preceding test phrase, the prime, was from 
the same story and so should facilitate the 
response to the target. This facilitation 
would serve as a control to show that prim- 
ing effects could be obtained with this pro- 
cedure. In other conditions, the prime 
phrase was from a completely unrelated 
story and should not facilitate responses. 
The interesting conditions were those in 
which the prime phrase was from the other 
story of the same MOP. In Experiments 1 
through 5, different questions were asked 
about possible facilitation effects from this 
prime phrase. 
The experiments were designed to use 
the amount of priming in recognition as a 
dependent variable, so that the results 
would reflect associations that were estab- 
lished in memory at the time of reading the 
stories, rather than associations that were 
constructed at the time of the retrieval test. 
We know that subjects can generate such 
constructions; given a cue from one of the 
stories and enough time, subjects could 
generate the appropriate associations even 
if they had not noticed the relations be- 
tween the two stories when they were stud- 
ied (cf. Seifert & Black, 1983). We have 
argued that the speeded item recognition 
procedure avoids such constructions at the 
time of the retrieval test (cf. Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 1978, 1981; McKoon & Ratcliff, 
1981, 1986, 1989c, 1989d). With speeded 
recognition, subjects do not have time to 
generate new associations. Also, with a 
large number of test items that appear un- 
related, there is no reason for the subjects 
to adopt strategies to generate one kind of 
association (the connections between sto- 
ries) over another. That subjects did not, in 
fact, adopt such strategies in the experi- 
ments below is demonstrated through the 
use of pairs of new test phrases that were 
related to the same MOP. A strategy of re- 
lying on the MOP relation between the 
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phrases of a pair instead of on memory for 
the stories would lead to fast errors on 
these phrases (responding old when the 
phrases were actually new), but such errors 
did not occur. 
THEORETICALPREVIEW 
The plan across the experiments was to 
investigate associations in memory be- 
tween two stories of the same MOP. Some 
experiments were designed to look for as- 
sociations between phrases that were re- 
lated to the MOP. For example in Table 1, 
slowly strolled into the ocean is related to 
the Going to the Beach MOP, and so is 
spread her towel in a dry place. These 
phrases might be associated with each 
other in memory either directly, because 
they themselves are associated with the 
same MOP, or indirectly because they are 
in stories that express the same MOP. 
Other experiments were designed to look 
for associations between MOP-unrelated 
phrases, such as decided to skip work on 
Thursday. This phrase could be associated 
to slowly strolled into the ocean only indi- 
rectly, by virtue of being in a story that 
shared the same MOP. 
Among models proposed to account for 
various findings about memory for MOP in- 
formation, the one most relevant to the ex- 
periments in this article is the “partial 
encoding” model proposed by Bower, 
Black, and Turner (1970). According to this 
model, MOP stories are stored separately 
in memory. The explicitly stated events of a 
story are encoded into a new structure in 
memory, which is marked as an instance of 
the appropriate MOP. In addition to the 
new structure, in the generic representation 
of the MOP, both stated and unstated MOP 
actions are tagged. What would be pre- 
dicted from this model is that two test 
phrases from the same story would prime 
each other more than two phrases from dif- 
ferent stories, even if the two stories shared 
the same MOP. This is not what is shown 
by the data from the experiments in this 
article. Experiment 1 shows essentially 
“perfect priming”; a target phrase of one 
story is facilitated as much by a phrase from 
another story of the same MOP as by a 
phrase from the same story, if the target 
and priming phrases are both related to the 
MOP. It might also be expected from the 
Bower, Black, and Turner (1970) model 
that, if two stories were related by the same 
MOP, then any phrase from one of the sto- 
ries would prime any phrase from the other 
story through the MOP connections. Again, 
this is not what the data show; in Experi- 
ments 2 and 3 there is no significant priming 
from a phrase of one story to a phrase from 
a different story of the same MOP, if the 
target phrase is not related to the MOP. To 
encompass this whole pattern of results, a 
new model is proposed in the General Dis- 
cussion section of this article. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
The main question in Experiment 1 was 
whether a MOP-related phrase from one 
story would facilitate responses to a MOP- 
related phrase from another story with the 
same MOP. The procedure followed the 
general procedure described above: a list of 
42 stories to be read followed by a list of 216 
test phrases. Prime-target pairs of phrases 
were embedded in the test list to represent 
the experimental conditions. An example of 
the materials is shown in Table 1. The two 
stories are both about going to the beach, 
and the individual events in the two stories 
parallel each other closely. 
The three conditions in the experiment 
are reflected in the test phrases shown for 
the second story. The target test phrase is 
the same in each condition, a phrase clearly 
and centrally related to the MOP. In the 
first condition, this phrase is primed by an- 
other MOP-related phrase from the same 
story; in the second condition, by a MOP- 
related phrase from the other story of the 
same MOP; and in the third condition, by a 
phrase from some other unrelated story. 
Facilitation would be expected in the first 
condition (the within-story condition) rela- 
tive to the third condition (the between- 
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MOP condition). The question was whether 
there would also be facilitation in the sec- 
ond condition (within-MOP, but between- 
stories) relative to the third. If there were 
associations in memory between the events 
of the two stories, then there should be 
such facilitation. 
In the first and second conditions just de- 
scribed, the prime and target phrases are 
related to the same MOP. So that subjects 
would not be able to respond old to the tar- 
get on the basis of this relationship alone, 
related pairs of lzew test phrases were in- 
cluded in the test list. These were phrases 
taken from stories like the stories that were 
studied by the subjects except that they 
were based on different MOPS than any of 
the studied stories (see examples in Table 
1). With these related new pairs included in 
the test list, a MOP relationship between 
one test phrase and an immediately follow- 
ing test phrase could not be used to decide 
whether the second phrase was old or new. 
Previous research provides two predic- 
tions about the outcome of Experiment 1. 
In the Seifert et al. (1986) study using the- 
matic relations between stories, a test state- 
ment from one story did not facilitate re- 
sponses to a test statement from another, 
thematically similar story. If MOP similar- 
ity operated in the same way as thematic 
similarity, then there would be no facilita- 
tion between test phrases from stories of 
the same MOP. A different outcome would 
be predicted from consideration of the in- 
formation shared by the test phrases in the 
experimental conditions. In the first condi- 
tion, the prime phrase and the target phrase 
share the same MOP and they come from 
the same story. It would be reasonable to 
predict that this condition would lead to 
more facilitation than the second condition, 
in which the prime and target share only 
MOP information (cf. Bower, Black, & 
Turner, 1979). 
Method 
Subjects. The 24 subjects participated in 
the experiment for credit in an introductory 
psychology course. Each subject partici- 
pated in one session lasting about 50 min. 
Materials. Twenty-one pairs of stories 
were written, each pair representing a dif- 
ferent MOP. Examples are shown in Table 
1. The stories described the events of a typ- 
ical instance of the MOP. There was no plot 
to the stories other than the standard MOP 
action sequence, and none of the events 
was surprising in the context of the MOP. 
The two stories of each MOP pair had par- 
allel structures and events, but differed in 
specific details. For example, in the restau- 
rant MOP, both stories described a fairly 
expensive, formal type of restaurant, one 
French and one Italian. Both meals in- 
cluded a dessert typical of such a meal, one 
chocolate mousse and one creme caramel. 
As can be seen in the examples, content 
words from one story of a pair were re- 
peated as rarely as possible in the other 
story of the pair. The stories averaged 108 
words in length. 
For each story, there were five test 
phrases. Each phrase was formed from a 
sentence that had a main character or char- 
acters of the story as subject, and then had 
this subject deleted to form a predicate 
phrase. This form of test was used because 
we had found in pilot work that when test 
sentences included the names of the char- 
acters, subjects became extremely con- 
cerned about memorizing the names of all 
the characters, and response times were 
slow and highly variable. Two phrases, one 
designated the target and the other the 
MOP prime, represented events closely re- 
lated to the MOP of the story; these are 
shown in the Appendix. These test phrases 
were parallel for the two stories of a pair in 
that they represented corresponding 
events. Another test phrase was also used 
as a prime, but was not specifically related 
to the MOP. Finally, there were two filler 
test phrases, which were not controlled 
with respect to relation to the MOP. The 
correct response for the first four test 
phrases was true or old, and for the last 
filler, the correct response was false. The 
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average length of the target phrases was 7.8 
words, and the average length of the prime 
phrases was 8.3 words. 
In addition to the MOP stories and their 
test phrases, there was a pool of phrases to 
be used as new (negative) test items in the 
final test. These test phrases came from 
stories other than those read by the sub- 
jects and concerned MOPS that were not 
used in any of the stories the subjects read. 
In other respects, the test phrases were 
similar to the ones used for the 42 MOP 
stories. 
Procedure. Materials were presented on 
CRT screens, and responses were collected 
on the CRT keyboards. The CRTs were 
controlled by a real-time microcomputer 
system. 
The experiment began with practice sto- 
ries and test phrases. First, a series of six 
stories was presented, each followed by a 
single true/false test phrase. Then there 
was a list of 20 test phrases over all six 
stories. Subjects were instructed that, for a 
test phrase immediately following a story, 
they were to decide whether it was true or 
false according to the story. For the list of 
20 test phrases, they were told that the pos- 
itive phrases would be phrases true accord- 
ing to one of the six stories and that nega- 
tive phrases would be phrases that were not 
at all related to any of the six stories. They 
were told that in this list there would be no 
false phrases related to any of the stories. 
Subjects were also told the form of the test 
phrases (predicates), and it was explained 
that this form of test item meant that they 
would not have to be concerned about 
memorizing character names or trying to 
keep track of which character did what. 
After the practice, subjects were told the 
form of the experiment proper: 42 stories, 
each followed by a true/false test phrase, 
and a final list of 216 test phrases. Each 
story began with an instruction presented 
on the CRT screen to press the space bar of 
the keyboard to initiate the story. Then the 
story was displayed for 22 s, the screen was 
cleared, there was 1 s pause, and the true/ 
false test item was displayed. The phrase 
remained on the screen until the subject 
pressed a response key (“?I” for true; “Z” 
forfalse). If the response was correct, then 
the instruction to press the space bar for the 
next story was displayed. If the response 
was incorrect, the word ERROR was dis- 
played for 2 s before the instruction to press 
the space bar. The 22 s reading time was 
chosen from pilot work; it allowed all sub- 
jects to read the stories completely at a 
comfortably slow rate. 
After the last story and its test phrase, 
the words FINAL TEST were shown for 10 
s, and then the list of final test phrases be- 
gan. Each phrase was displayed until the 
subject made a response, old or new. Error 
feedback was given in the same way as for 
the test phrases following stories, and then 
the next test phrase appeared after 100 ms. 
The 42 stories were presented in random 
order, except that the two stories of a pair 
were separated by at least 8 other stories. 
The final list of 216 test phrases was made 
up of 126 positive phrases and 90 negative 
phrases. Of the 126 positive phrases, 42 
were target phrases and each of these was 
immediately preceded by a positive priming 
phrase. The other 42 positive items were 
fillers from the studied stories. Some of the 
90 negative test phrases were presented as 
related pairs, so that one negative test 
phrase would be followed by another nega- 
tive test phrase related to the same MOP. 
On the average (across subjects), there 
were 27 such pairs and 36 other negative 
phrases. Test phrases were presented in 
random order, except that targets could not 
be among the first 15 test phrases, and a 
filler positive phrase could not appear in the 
three positions preceding the target from 
the same story. 
Design. A target phrase from a story was 
immediately preceded in the final test list 
by another phrase from the same story (the 
MOP-related prime), a phrase from the 
other story of the same MOP (also a MOP- 
related prime), or a phrase from another 
story about a different MOP (a prime not 
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specifically related to a MOP). These three 
conditions were combined with groups of 
subjects (eight per group) and sets of stories 
(14 per set) in a Latin square design. 
Results 
Means were calculated for each subject 
and test phrase in each condition; only re- 
sponses for which responses to the preced- 
ing test phrase were correct were included 
in these means. The means show that the 
response to a target test phrase was facili- 
tated as much by a priming phrase from a 
different story with the same MOP as by a 
priming phrase from the same story. When 
a target was primed by another phrase from 
the same story, the mean response time 
was 1287 ms (10% errors). The mean was 
1283 ms (11% errors), when the prime was 
a phrase from the other story of the MOP 
pair. When the prime was from a com- 
pletely unrelated story, the mean response 
time was 1417 ms (17% errors). The differ- 
ence among the response time means was 
significant with subjects as a random vari- 
able, F(2,46) = 5.08 (p < .05 throughout 
this article), and with test phrases as a ran- 
dom variable, F(2,82) = 3.82. The differ- 
ence among error rates was also significant, 
F(2,46) = 3.63 with subjects as the random 
variable and F(2,82) = 6.11 with test 
phrases as the random variable. The stan- 
dard error of the response times was 
29.6 ms. 
For the test phrases that immediately fol- 
lowed the stories during the reading phase 
of the experiment, the average response 
time for true test phrases was 1653 ms (15% 
errors), and the average for false test 
phrases was 1672 ms (13% errors). On final 
test phrases other than targets, positive re- 
sponses averaged 1378 ms (18% errors). 
The mean for negative responses that did 
not immediately follow another related neg- 
ative phrase was 1484 ms (9% errors) and 
the mean for negative test phrases that fol- 
lowed related negative test phrases was 
1472 ms (17% errors); both of these means 
represent responses for which there was a 
correct negative response on the previous 
test item. This indication of a speed/ 
accuracy trade-off for the negatives will be 
observed in all of the following experi- 
ments. This trade-off might indicate that 
subjects were using the relational informa- 
tion to speed up their responses, and as a 
result they made more errors on the nega- 
tive phrases that followed related negative 
phrases. However, this was not the case 
because the error reaction times were actu- 
ally very slow, 1622 ms and 1588 ms, re- 
spectively. Furthermore, for the related 
negative test items, the distributions of the 
responses faster than the mean for correct 
and error response times were about the 
same, so the errors do not represent a prob- 
ability mixture of fast guesses based on re- 
latedness and other, slow responses (this 
check of the distributions was done for this 
experiment and for Experiment 3). These 
results for negatives show that a simple 
strategy of using relational information to 
speed responses could not account for the 
facilitation effects observed with positive 
responses. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 support the 
idea that, when two stories share a MOP, 
MOP-related phrases from the two different 
stories are just as closely associated as 
MOP-related phrases from the same story. 
Spreading out her towel in a dry place from 
one story and found an empty space for her 
blanket from the other story appear to be 
equally good primes for slowly strolled into 
the cool ocean. 
It should be noted that the facilitation 
given by a MOP-related priming phrase to a 
MOP-related target cannot be due to simple 
and direct semantic associations between 
the individual words of the prime and target 
phrases. Most of the prime-target pairs do 
not contain direct associates (see the Ap- 
pendix), and work by de Groot (1983), Ba- 
lota and Larch (1986), and McNamara and 
Altarriba (1988) has shown that, in lexical 
decision, the range of priming is only to 
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close associates, and not further to the 
range of associates that would be required 
to account for the results of Experiment 1. 
Experiment 1 shows that there is equally 
good facilitation on a target from a different 
story of the same MOP as from the same 
story. The question immediately raised is 
whether the facilitation is a consequence of 
the MOP structure shared by the informa- 
tion in the test phrases, or whether it ex- 
tends to all information present in the sto- 
ries. This question was addressed in Exper- 
iment 2 by examining facilitation for test 
phrases not related to the MOPS of their 
stories. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 2, the question was 
whether a priming phrase from a story of a 
MOP pair would give facilitation to a target 
phrase from the other story of the pair when 
the information in the target phrase was not 
related to the MOP. The design was the 
same as in Experiment 1 except that the 
target phrases were changed so that they 
were not related to the MOPS of their sto- 
ries. To provide these phrases, new infor- 
mation was added to each story; this infor- 
mation fit in logically with the story, but 
was in no way related to the MOP. For ex- 
ample, as shown in Table 2, new informa- 
tion in one story of the Going to the Beach 
MOP was that the main character usually 
enjoyed the power of her executive secre- 
tary position, and new information in the 
other story was that the main character 
watched the cliffs above her for nesting 
swallows. 
Method 
The main difference between Experi- 
ments 1 and 2 was that in Experiment 2, 
each story was changed by the addition of 
one piece of information that was not re- 
lated to the MOP (see Table 2). This in- 
formation was used to form the MOP- 
unrelated target test phrase for the story. 
The prime phrase was the same as that used 
in Experiment 1. In all other respects, the 
materials, procedure, and design were the 
same as in Experiment 1. There were 30 
subjects from the same population as Ex- 
periment 1. 
Results 
In contrast to Experiment 1, responses to 
target test phrases were facilitated signifi- 
cantly only when the priming phrase was 
from the same story. Mean response times 
to a target were 1291 ms (16% errors) when 
the prime was from the same story as the 
target. When the prime was from the other 
story of the same MOP as the target, the 
mean response time was 1351 ms (19% 
errors), not much different than when the 
prime was from an unrelated story, 1360 ms 
(22% errors). Overall, the mean response 
times differed significant, F(2,58) = 5.20 
with subjects as the random variable, and 
F(2,78) = 3.11 with test phrases as the ran- 
dom variable. Standard error of the re- 
sponse time means was 18.3 ms. The differ- 
ences among error rates were not signifi- 
cant, F’s < 1.85. 
In the final test list, responses on positive 
tillers averaged 1309 ms (15% errors). Re- 
sponses on negative fillers averaged 1442 
ms (14% errors, 1522 ms error RTs), and 
responses on the negative fillers that were 
preceded by related negative fillers aver- 
aged 1420 ms (20% errors, 1400 ms error 
RTs); in both cases, the means are for re- 
sponses that were preceded by a correct 
negative response. For test phrases pre- 
sented during the reading phase, the means 
were 1506 ms (17% errors) for true items 
and 1619 ms (11% errors) for false items. 
Discussion 
The result of Experiment 1 shows that 
MOP-related information from one story is 
closely associated to MOP-related informa- 
tion from another story that shares the 
same MOP. Experiment 2 shows that this 
result does not extend to MOP-unrelated 
information. MOP-unrelated information 
appears to be associated to other informa- 
tion in its story, but not to information from 
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TABLE 2 
MOP: GOING TO THE BEACH 
story 1 
Linda decided to skip work on Thursday and go to the beach. At the beach, Linda found the parking 
lot to be surprisingly full for a weekday, but she eventually found a spot. The beach, too, was 
crowded, but Linda was still able to spread her towel in a dry place close to the water. Not wanting 
to get a sunburn, Linda put on some suntan lotion. After lying on her towel for some time, Linda 
was getting hot so she decided to take a dip, and dove into the refreshing water. Although she 
usually enjoyed the power of her executive secretary position, today she was happy not to be at 
work. After a short swim, Linda toweled off and packed up her things for the long walk to the car. 
story 2 
Because the sun was shining so brightly, Nancy decided to spend the day by the sea. When she had 
gotten to her favorite seaside spot, Nancy parked her car under a tree. Nancy walked quickly over 
the hot sand until she found an empty space where she could lay her blanket. Hoping to add some 
color to her pale skin, Nancy splashed on some baby oil. The sun was very strong, so Nancy decided 
to get up and go for a swim. Nancy slowly strolled out into the cool ocean. Her hobby was 
bird-watching, so she watched the cliffs above her for nesting swallows. When she finally felt 
water-logged, she headed back to her blanket. She dried off for a while in the warm sun and then 
dressed for the trip home. 
Test phrases for the second story 
Condition 1, MOP-related prime from the same story 
MOP-related prime: found an empty space for her blanket. 
Target test phrase: watched the cliffs above for nesting swallows. 
Condition 2, MOP-related prime from the other story with the same MOP 
MOP-related prime: spread her towel in a dry place. 
Target test phrase: watched the cliffs above for nesting swallows. 
Condition 3, prime from another unrelated story 
Unrelated prime: looked over the wine list and ordered chablis. 
Target test phrase: watched the cliffs above for nesting swallows. 
Filler old (positive) test item 
parked her car under a tree. 
False test item 
decided to spend the day at the lake. 
Filler new (negative) test items 
had not started the research on time. 
eventually found some sources for the paper. 
loaded the books into a heavy backpack. 
another story of the same MOP. These are 
the basic results that will be discussed in 
the General Discussion. Experiments 3, 4, 
and 5 rule out several alternative explana- 
tions of these results. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
In Experiment 1, a MOP-related prime 
gave equal facilitation to MOP-related tar- 
gets from the same story as to MOP-related 
targets from a different story of the same 
MOP. One explanation of this result that 
would make it uninteresting would be that 
the MOP-related phrases used for targets in 
the two stories are synonymous. For exam- 
ple, suppose that the target in one story was 
had creme caramel for a final course and 
the target in the other story was had cara- 
mel custard for dessert. These two phrases 
would be essentially synonymous, and so it 
would be no surprise to find that responses 
to either of them could be facilitated by a 
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MOP-related prime from either story. Al- 
though the targets used in Experiment 1 
(shown in the Appendix) were nor so 
clearly synonymous as these examples, it is 
difficult to know how to evaluate synon- 
ymy in discourse contexts. Thus, Experi- 
ment 3 was conducted to rule out a synon- 
ymy explanation of the results of Experi- 
ment 1. 
Experiment 3 was identical to Experi- 
ment 2 in that the same stories and the same 
MOP-unrelated target were used. How- 
ever, the prime phrases were changed to be 
the MOP-related phrases that were used as 
targets in Experiment 1. Thus, for the sec- 
ond story in Table 2, the target test phrase 
was watched the cliffs above for nesting 
swallows. Its priming phrase from the same 
story was slowly strolled out into the cool 
ocean and its priming phrase from the other 
story of the same MOP was dove into the 
refreshing water. 
The reasoning behind Experiment 3 was 
that, if the two priming phrases (used as 
targets in Experiment 1) were synonymous, 
then they should facilitate responses to the 
target equally well. Watched the cliffs for 
nesting swallows should be facilitated 
equally well by the prime from the same 
story as by the prime from the other story 
of the same MOP. Although the two prim- 
ing phrases do not appear to be exactly syn- 
onymous, in their story contexts they may 
be close enough to synonymy to give sta- 
tistically equivalent amounts of facilitation 
to the target. Alternatively, if the two prim- 
ing phrases are not synonymous even in 
their story contexts, then the prime from 
the same story should give more facilitation 
to the target. This result would replicate the 
result of Experiment 2, where the MOP- 
related prime from the same story gave 
more facilitation to a MOP-unrelated tar- 
get. 
Method 
The stories, test phrases, and procedure 
were all the same as in Experiment 2. The 
same MOP-unrelated phrases were used as 
targets. The only difference from Experi- 
ment 2 was that the MOP-related targets 
from Experiment 1 were used as primes. 
There were three experimental conditions: 
the prime for the MOP-unrelated target was 
from the same story, from a different story 
of the same MOP, or from a completely un- 
related story. There were 57 subjects from 
the same population as Experiment 1. This 
large number of subjects was used because 
average target response times were some- 
what faster with a prime from another story 
of the same MOP than with a prime from an 
unrelated story; however, this difference 
never reached even marginal statistical sig- 
nificance . 
Results 
If the two MOP-related phrases used as 
primes did not function as though they were 
synonymous, then the results should repli- 
cate the results of Experiment 2. A MOP- 
unrelated target should be facilitated more 
by a priming phrase from the same story 
than by a priming phrase from a different 
story of the same MOP, and a priming 
phrase from a different story of the same 
MOP should give no more facilitation than 
a priming phrase from an unrelated story. 
This is the result that obtained. Response 
times for the targets were faster with the 
prime from the same story than with the 
prime from the other story of the same 
MOP. The average response times were 
1467 ms (18% errors) and 1530 ms (22% 
errors), respectively. With the prime from 
an unrelated story, the mean response time 
was 1573 ms (25% errors). Overall, the re- 
sponse time means differed significantly, 
F(2,112) = 7.7 with subjects as the random 
variable and F(2,82) = 3.6 with items as the 
random variable. Although response times 
in the condition with the prime from an- 
other story of the same MOP were faster 
than response times in the condition with 
an unrelated prime, this difference was not 
significant, F’s < 1.6. The standard error 
for the response time means was 20.7 ms. 
Differences in error rates were significant, 
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F(2,112) = 6.04 with subjects as the ran- 
dom variable and F(2,82) = 5.4 with items 
as the random variable. 
In the final test list, responses on positive 
fillers averaged 1563 ms (17% errors). Re- 
sponses on negative fillers averaged 1742 
ms (16% errors, 1974 ms error RTs), and 
responses on the negative fillers that were 
preceded by related negative tillers aver- 
aged 1663 ms (22% errors, 1688 ms error 
RTs); in both cases, the means are for re- 
sponses that were preceded by a correct 
negative response. The distributions of re- 
sponse times faster than the means for cor- 
rect and error responses to the related neg- 
atives were not different. For test phrases 
presented during the reading phase, the 
means were 1690 ms (14% errors) for true 
items and 1882 ms (16% errors) for false 
items. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 was designed to test 
whether the results of Experiment 1 could 
be explained by the synonymy of the MOP- 
related targets used in Experiment 1. If the 
targets were synonymous, then when they 
were used as primes, they should have 
given facilitation to target phrases from dif- 
ferent stories of the same MOP. This did 
not occur, although there appeared to be 
some facilitation in the response time 
means, the effect was not even marginally 
significant. Instead, Experiment 3 repli- 
cated Experiment 2, in that MOP-related 
phrases gave significant facilitation only to 
MOP-unrelated phrases from the same 
story. 
EXPERIMENTS 4 AND 5 
Experiment 3 ruled out one possible ex- 
planation for the result of Experiment 1. 
Another possible explanation is that the as- 
sociations between MOP-related events in 
different stories are due to semantic over- 
lap between the individual phrases used as 
primes. The semantic overlap would not be 
direct, context-free associations, but con- 
textual semantic overlap based on the gen- 
era1 MOP structure. In other words, in the 
context of the MOP about going to the 
beach, finding a place for a blanket is not 
very different from spreading a towel, and 
it may be this similarity between the spe- 
cific phrases used as primes rather than the 
similarity between the stories as a whole 
that accounts for the facilitation obtained in 
Experiment 1. 
There is also an alternative explanation 
of the results of Experiment 2. It might be 
that the similarity between the primes 
causes subjects to have problems in dis- 
criminating whether a test phrase appeared 
in one or the other of the two possible sto- 
ries with the same MOP. This discrimina- 
tion problem might have covered up a real 
facilitation effect in Experiment 2 when a 
MOP-unrelated target was primed by a 
phrase from the other story of the same 
MOP. (This problem would also have re- 
duced the amount of facilitation that was 
actually observed in Experiment 1.) 
These two possible alternative explana- 
tions, one for the results of Experiment 1 
and one for the results of Experiment 2, 
were examined in Experiments 4 and 5 us- 
ing a condition in which the priming phrase 
from one story did not have a parallel in the 
other story of the same MOP (see Table 3). 
In this condition (Condition 2 in Table 3), 
the target was primed by a MOP-related 
phrase from the other story with the same 
MOP, but there was no parallel phrase in 
the story of the target. In Condition 1, there 
was such a phrase, as there had been in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Condition 3 was the 
same as in the previous experiments, a 
prime from a story unrelated to the target. 
In Experiment 4, the targets were MOP- 
related (as shown in Table 3). If the facili- 
tation on these targets from a phrase from 
another story of the same MOP was due to 
the specific similarity between individual 
phrases and not to overlap between the 
whole stories, then the facilitation effect 
should disappear in Condition 2 of Experi- 
ment 3. It should be stressed that the ex- 
periment only tests for the effect of the 
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TABLE 3 
MOP: GOING TO THE BEACH 
story 1 
Linda decided to skip work on Thursday and go to the beach. At the beach, Linda found the parking 
lot to be surprisingly full for a weekday, but she eventually found a spot. The beach, too, was 
crowded, but Linda was still able to spread her towel in a dry place close to the water. Not wanting 
to get a sunburn, Linda put on some suntan lotion. After lying on her towel for some time, Linda 
was getting hot so she decided to take a dip, and dove into the refreshing water. Although she 
usually enjoyed the power of her executive secretary position, today she was happy not to be at 
work. After a short swim, Linda toweled off and packed up her things for the long walk to the car. 
Story 2, with phrase corresponding to priming phrase in Story I 
Because the sun was shining so brightly, Nancy decided to spend the day by the sea. When she had 
gotten to her favorite seaside spot, Nancy parked her car under a tree. Nancy walked quickly over 
the hot sand until she found an empty space where she could lay her blanket. Hoping to add some 
color to her pale skin, Nancy splashed on some baby oil. The sun was very strong, so Nancy decided 
to get up and go for a swim. Nancy slowly strolled out into the cool ocean. Her hobby was 
bird-watching, so she watched the cliffs above her for nesting swallows. When she finally felt 
water-logged, she headed back to her blanket. She dried off for a while in the warm sun and then 
dressed for the trip home. 
Story 2, without phrase corresponding to priming phrase in Story 1 
Because the sun was shining so brightly, Nancy decided to spend the day by the sea. When she had 
gotten to her favorite seaside spot, Nancy parked her car under a tree. Nancy walked quickly over 
the hot sand. Hoping to add some color to her pale skin, Nancy splashed on some baby oil. The sun 
was very strong, so Nancy decided to get up and go for a swim. Nancy slowly strolled out into the 
cool ocean. Her hobby was bird-watching, so she watched the cliffs above her for nesting swallows. 
When she finally felt water-logged, she headed back to her blanket. She dried off for a while in the 
warm sun and then dressed for the trip home. 
Test phrases for the second story 
Condition 1, MOP-related prime from Story 1, study Stories I and 2a 
MOP-related prime: spread her towel in a dry place 
Target test phrase: slowly strolled out into the cool ocean. 
Condition 2, MOP-related prime from Story 1, study Stories 1 and 2b 
MOP-related prime: spread her towel in a dry place. 
Target test phrase: slowly strolled out into the cool ocean. 
Condition 3, prime from another unrelated story: 
Unrelated prime: looked over the wine list and ordered chablis. 
Target test phrase: slowly strolled out into the cool ocean. 
presence or absence of an explicitly stated 
parallel phrase. It might be that subjects 
would infer the phrase when it was not 
stated explicitly. However, it seems un- 
likely that subjects could infer the phrase so 
exactly that it would function in the same 
way as if it had been explicitly stated (cf. 
McKoon & Ratcliff, 1989a, 1989b, 1989d). 
In Experiment 5, the targets were MOP- 
unrelated as in Experiment 2. If the lack of 
facilitation on these targets from a phrase 
from another story of the same MOP was 
due to the kind of discrimination problems 
mentioned above, then these problems 
should disappear when there is no overlap 
between individual phrases, and facilitation 
might appear in this condition. 
Method 
Subjects. There were 40 subjects in Ex- 
periment 4 and 33 subjects in Experiment 5, 
all from the same population as Experi- 
ment 1. 
Materials and Procedure. For each of the 
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stories used in Experiment 2, a new version 
of the story was formed by deleting from 
the original story the information that cor- 
responded to the MOP-related prime in the 
other story of the pair. For example, in Ta- 
ble 3, the priming phrase from Story 1 is 
spread her towel in a dry place, and the 
parallel phrase in the target story is found 
an empty space for her blanket. This phrase 
was present in the first version of Story 2, 
and deleted in the second version. 
All of the test phrases remained the same 
as in Experiments 1 and 2, and the proce- 
dure for testing was the same as in Exper- 
iments 1 and 2. 
Design. In the first two conditions, the 
target phrase for a story was primed by a 
MOP-related prime from the other story of 
its pair. In Condition 1, the phrase corre- 
sponding to the prime was present in the 
target’s story, and in Condition 2, the cor- 
responding phrase was not present in the 
target’s story. In Condition 3, the prime for 
the target was from a completely unrelated 
story. In Experiment 4, the target itself was 
related to the MOP of its story, while in 
Experiment 5, the target was not related to 
the MOP. 
Results 
In Experiment 4, responses to the MOP- 
related targets were facilitated equally well 
by the MOP-related primes in Conditions 1 
and 2. That is, it did not matter that in Con- 
dition 2, the phrase equivalent to the prim- 
ing phrase was missing from the target’s 
story. The mean response time in Condition 
1, when the phrase equivalent to the prim- 
ing phrase was in the target’s story, was 
1402 ms (11% errors); in Condition 2, the 
mean was actually a little faster, 1373 ms 
(11% errors). In the third condition, where 
the prime was from a story unrelated to the 
target’s story, mean response time was 
1486 ms (18% errors). Differences among 
the response time means were significant, 
F(2,78) = 11.76 with subjects as the ran- 
dom variable, and F(2,82) = 17.32 with 
items as the random variable. Post hoc tests 
showed the difference between conditions 1 
and 2 was not significant, F’s < 1.3. Differ- 
ences in error rates were significant, 
F(2,78) = 4.1 with subjects as the random 
variable, and F(2,82) = 2.73 (marginally 
significant) with items as the random vari- 
able. The standard error for the mean re- 
sponse times was 18 ms. 
On filler test phrases, the mean for posi- 
tive responses was 1481 ms (18% errors). 
For single negative phrases, the mean was 
1617 ms (9% errors, 1697 ms error RTs), 
and for negative phrases immediately fol- 
lowing related negative phrases, 1583 ms 
(21% errors, 1652 ms error RTs), in both 
cases conditionalized on a correct response 
to an immediately preceding negative test 
item. On the test phrases that followed sto- 
ries during the reading phase, the mean for 
true phrases was 1628 ms (8% errors) and 
the mean for false phrases was 1757 ms (9% 
errors). 
In Experiment 2, when targets were 
MOP-unrelated, there was no apparent 
priming between stories with the same 
MOP. This result did not change in Exper- 
iment 5 when the phrase corresponding to 
the MOP-related prime was removed from 
the target story. Mean response times did 
not differ significantly across experimental 
conditions (F’s < 1.2). The means for Con- 
ditions 1, 2, and 3 were: 1457 ms (21% 
errors), 1417 ms (17% errors), and 1465 ms 
(25% errors). The standard error for the re- 
sponse times was 18 ms. The differences in 
error rates were significant by subjects but 
not items; F(2,64) = 5.7 (p < .Ol) with sub- 
jects as the random variable, and F(2,82) = 
2.3 0, > . 10) with items as the random vari- 
able. This effect on errors might indicate 
that Condition 2, in which priming phrases 
were not present in the target story, led to 
slightly better discrimination, as discussed 
in the introduction to the experiment. But 
the effect is not significant with items so no 
firm conclusions can be drawn. 
For tiller positive test items, mean re- 
sponse times were 1422 ms (16% errors). 
For single negatives, the mean was 1525 ms 
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(12% errors; 1619 ms error RTs), and for 
negatives that followed related negatives, 
the mean was 1488 ms (21% errors, 1642 ms 
error RTs), both conditionalized on a cor- 
rect negative response to the previous test 
item. For true phrases that immediately fol- 
lowed stories, responses averaged 1474 ms 
(12% errors), and for false phrases, 1707 ms 
(12% errors). 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 show that 
the facilitation observed in Experiment 1 is 
not due to repetition of specific action 
phrases in the two stories of the same MOP. 
Instead, it appears that the overall MOP 
similarity of the two stories accounts for 
the facilitation effect for MOP-related 
items. In addition, Experiment 5 replicated 
Experiment 2, in that the MOP relationship 
did not produce any facilitation when the 
test items were unrelated to the MOPS. 
Therefore, relations between specific ac- 
tions in the priming items of the two stories 
did not determine the results of Experi- 
ments 1 and 2. 
EXPERIMENT 6 
One way to describe the results of Exper- 
iments 1 and 4 would be to say that subjects 
cannot discriminate whether two MOP- 
related phrases were from the same or dif- 
ferent stories. For such phrases, a prime 
from the other story with the same MOP 
gives just as much facilitation as a prime 
from the same story. However, in Experi- 
ments 1 and 4, facilitation was measured 
with a speeded recognition task, and sub- 
jects were not explicitly required to dis- 
criminate between stories. Experiment 6 
used a different task, forced choice recog- 
nition, that did require subjects to explicitly 
decide whether a test phrase belonged to a 
particular story that they had read. 
In Experiment 6, subjects read stories 
following the same procedure as in the 
other experiments. This procedure in- 
cluded the same practice with six stories 
followed by their final list of 20 test 
phrases. But the final test list that followed 
the 40 experimental stories was different. 
For each item in the list, the first four lines 
of one of the studied stories were pre- 
sented, followed by two test phrases. A 
subject’s task was to decide which of the 
two phrases had appeared in the story that 
began with the four lines. It was always the 
case that both phrases had appeared in one 
of the studied stories. An example of the 
conditions in Experiment 6 is shown in Ta- 
ble 4. Because the procedure was exactly 
the same in Experiment 6 as in the other 
experiments up to the point of the final test, 
it can be assumed that subjects learned the 
stories in the same way as for the other 
experiments. From the practice, they ex- 
pected the same kind of final test, and they 
were instructed about the choice task only 
after all stories had been read. 
For MOP-related test phrases, in Condi- 
tion 1, the incorrect choice was from the 
other story of the same MOP. If subjects’ 
performance is better than chance in Con- 
dition 1, then it can be concluded that sub- 
jects can discriminate which MOP-related 
phrase goes with which of the two MOP 
stories. In Condition 2, the choice is be- 
tween a test phrase that clearly fits the 
MOP of the four story lines and a test 
phrase that is completely MOP-unrelated. 
Condition 2 was included in the experiment 
so that there would be one condition in 
which subjects could be sure of their 
choices; whether they rely on memory or 
guessing, they should be able to make the 
correct choice. 
For MOP-unrelated test phrases, in Con- 
dition 3, the incorrect choice was from the 
other story with the same MOP as the four 
story lines. Neither test phrase was related 
to the MOP, so that correct discrimination 
should depend on memory for the studied 
story. In Condition 4, the incorrect choice 
was from a story completely unrelated to 
the four story lines, and again successful 
discrimination should depend on memory 
for the story as it was studied. 
In all of the conditions of Experiment 6, 
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TABLE 4 
EXAMPLES OF EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS IN EXPERIMENT 5 
Condition 1, MOP-related test phrases from stories of the same MOP 
Linda decided to skip work on Thursday and go to the beach. At the beach, Linda found the parking 
lot to be surprisingly full for a weekday, but she eventually found a spot. The beach, too, was 
crowded, but Linda was still able to spread her towel in a dry place close to 
slowly strolled out into the cool ocean. 
dove into the refreshing water. (the correct choice) 
Condition 2, MOP-related test phrases from stories of different MOPS 
Linda decided to skip work on Thursday and go to the beach. At the beach, Linda found the parking 
lot to be surprisingly full for a weekday, but she eventually found a spot. The beach, too, was 
crowded, but Linda was still able to spread her towel in a dry place close to 
looked over the wine list and ordered chablis. 
dove into the refreshing water. (the correct choice) 
Condition 3, MOP-unrelated test phrases from stories of the same MOP 
Linda decided to skip work on Thursday and go to the beach. At the beach, Linda found the parking 
lot to be surprisingly full for a weekday, but she eventually found a spot. The beach, too, was 
crowded, but Linda was still able to spread her towel in a dry place close to 
watched the cliffs above for nesting swallows. 
enjoyed the power of her executive secretary position. (the correct choice) 
Condition 4, MOP-unrelated test phrases from stories of different MOPS 
Linda decided to skip work on Thursday and go to the beach. At the beach, Linda found the parking 
lot to be surprisingly full for a weekday, but she eventually found a spot. The beach, too, was 
crowded, but Linda was still able to spread her towel in a dry place close to 
was coming down with a cold and fever. 
enjoyed the power of her executive secretary position. (the correct choice) 
discriminative information from memory 
may be disregarded by subjects in favor of 
other information generated at the time of 
the forced choice test. For example, one of 
the test phrases may fit with the four story 
lines better than the second, even when the 
second is the correct choice. To measure 
performance based on this kind of informa- 
tion, a second group of subjects was given 
only the test phase of the experiment; they 
never read the stories. These subjects pro- 
vided a control against which performance 
of subjects who read the stories could be 
measured. If the subjects who read the sto- 
ries show better discrimination than the 
control subjects, then it can be concluded 
that they have some discriminative infor- 
mation in memory. However, if their per- 
formance is not better, then it may be that 
they are using the same kind of information 
as the control subjects and ignoring infor- 
mation from memory for the stories. So re- 
sults showing performance no better than 
the control subjects will not allow the con- 
clusion that memory contains no discrimi- 
nating information. Rather, it might be that 
subjects who read the stories disregarded 
whatever discriminating information was 
available in memory in favor of information 
available in the forced choiced task. 
Method 
Subjects. There were 24 subjects from 
the same population as the previous exper- 
iments . 
Materials. Twenty of the pairs of stories 
from Experiments 1 and 2 were used. The 
true/false test phrases that immediately fol- 
lowed the stories were also the same as in 
Experiments 1 and 2. For the final test, the 
test phrases were either the MOP-related 
targets or the MOP-unrelated targets, the 
same phrases as were used in the previous 
experiments. 
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Procedure. The procedures for practice 
and for reading the stories (each story with 
one immediately following true/false test 
phrase) were the same as in the previous 
experiments. The final test phase began 
with instructions; subjects were told that 
they would be given the first four lines of 
each story, plus two test phrases. They 
were to decide which of the two test 
phrases had actually appeared in the story 
indicated by the four lines. Each test item 
began with a message on the CRT screen to 
press the space bar of the keyboard. Then 
the four lines of the story and the two test 
phrases were presented simultaneously, 
with the test phrases separated from the 
story and each other by blank lines. The 
subjects pressed the “?I” key to indicate 
that the first of the test phrases was the 
correct choice, and the “Z” key to indicate 
that the second was the correct choice. If 
the response was incorrect, the word 
ERROR was displayed for 2 s. Then the 
message to press the space bar was dis- 
played for the next test item. The 40 test 
items, one per story, were presented in ran- 
dom order, and the position of the correct 
test phrase (first or second) was chosen 
randomly. 
Design. The two test phrases for a story 
were either both MOP-related or both 
MOP-unrelated, with respect to the story in 
which they had appeared during study. The 
test phrase that was the wrong choice was 
either from the other story of the same 
MOP as the correct choice, or from some 
unrelated story. These four conditions were 
combined in a Latin square design with four 
groups of subject (six per group) and four 
sets of stories (10 per set). 
Control subjects. A second group of 16 
subjects was used to provide a control. 
They did not read the 40 stories and were 
given only a final test list (constructed by 
the same design as for the other subjects). 
They were told to guess as well as they 
could which of the two test phrases would 
have been in a story that began with the 
four story lines. 
Results 
For Conditions 1 and 2, with MOP- 
related test phrases, subjects who read the 
stories did not do significantly better than 
the control subjects who did not read the 
stories. In Condition 1, subjects who read 
the stories were 63% correct and subjects 
who did not read the stories were 55% cor- 
rect. In Condition 2, the corresponding fig- 
ures were 90% and 98%. In neither condi- 
tion was the difference between the two 
groups of subjects larger than two standard 
errors (two standard errors equalled 9%). 
While the difference in Condition 1 ap- 
proached significance, the size of the differ- 
ence was small in absolute terms. 
For Conditions 3 and 4, with MOP- 
unrelated test phrases, subjects who read 
the stories did do better. In Condition 3, 
with incorrect test phrases from the other 
story of the same MOP as the correct 
choices, performance was 69% correct for 
subjects who read the stories and 51% cor- 
rect for subjects who did not. In Condition 
4, with incorrect test phrases from unre- 
lated stories, correct performance was 83% 
and 69%. In both Conditions, the differ- 
ences are larger than two standard errors 
(as above, 9%). 
Discussion 
With MOP-related test phrases, subjects’ 
performance does not show significant dis- 
crimination; their performance does not 
show which of the two test phrases was ac- 
tually studied in the same story as the four 
story lines given at test. However, as men- 
tioned in the introduction to the experi- 
ment, this result does not allow the conclu- 
sion that memory contains no discriminat- 
ing information. Instead, all that can be 
concluded is that whatever discriminating 
information there is must be weak enough 
that it can be ignored in favor of other in- 
formation available at test time. If there is 
memory for discriminating information, it is 
disregarded and the test is completed using 
other information (e.g., general knowl- 
edge). 
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With MOP-unrelated test phrases, sub- 
jects do show discrimination; their perfor- 
mance does show which of the two test 
phrases were studied in the same story as 
the four lines. This result parallels the re- 
sult obtained in Experiment 2 with speeded 
item recognition, which was that facilita- 
tion for a target phrase appeared only with 
a prime from the same story and not a prime 
from the other story of the same MOP. 
GENERAL DISCUSSON 
The main results from the experiments 
can be summarized as follows: For MOP- 
related target phrases, responses can be fa- 
cilitated by phrases from another story of 
the same MOP as well as by phrases of the 
target’s own story. But for MOP-unrelated 
target phrases, responses are facilitated 
only by phrases of the same story as the 
target. 
Secondary results ruled out possible al- 
ternative interpretations of the main re- 
sults. Experiment 3 showed that the MOP- 
related targets did not function as though 
they were synonymous and so eliminated 
synonymy as an explanation of the results 
of Experiment 1. Experiments 4 and 5 show 
that neither the results for MOP-related tar- 
gets nor the results for MOP-unrelated tar- 
gets depended on the target’s story having a 
specific phrase parallel to the priming 
phrase in the other story. In Experiment 6, 
when subjects were asked to discriminate 
which phrases belonged to which stories, 
they did so (although not perfectly) for 
MOP-unrelated targets but not for MOP- 
related targets. 
Several models can be considered that 
could possibly account for these results. 
The “full copy model,” one of the models 
suggested by Bower, Black, and Turner 
(1979), is based on the assumption that each 
episode or story for a MOP is encoded sep- 
arately from any other story for that MOP. 
The representation for each story contains 
the information stated explicitly in the story 
plus default values for parts of the MOP 
that were not stated explicitly. Bower et al. 
pointed out that this model could not ac- 
count for their data because it included no 
mechanism to account for confusions be- 
tween two separate MOP stories. The 
model has the same problem in accounting 
for the data of the experiments presented 
here. There appears to be no way for infor- 
mation from one story to give facilitation to 
responses for test phrases from the other 
story of the same MOP. 
A second model suggested by Bower et 
al. (1979) is the “partial-copy” modei, men- 
tioned in the introduction of this article. Re- 
call that in this model, each story is en- 
coded separately into memory, and that, in 
addition to the new structure for a story, 
both stated and unstated MOP actions are 
tagged in the generic representation of the 
MOP. This model can account for confu- 
sions about which action was stated in 
which story because of the tagging in the 
generic MOP representation. However, the 
model has difficulty with the results of Ex- 
periments 1 and 6. Both MOP-related target 
phrases and MOP-related priming phrases 
should be encoded into the new structure 
representing their stories, as well as being 
tagged in the generic MOP. When the prime 
and target presented for test are from the 
same story, the target should be facilitated 
both because prime and target are in the 
same new structure together and because 
they are tagged in the same generic MOP. 
When the prime and target share the same 
MOP but are from different stories, then 
the target should be facilitated only because 
it is tagged in the generic MOP. There 
should be facilitation in this condition, but 
it should be less than the facilitation ob- 
served when prime and target are from the 
same story. However, the data showed 
equal amounts of facilitation in the two con- 
ditions. The only way to make the partial- 
copy model fit the data is to assume that the 
equal amounts of facilitation are due to a 
floor effect on response times, but the times 
are slow enough (around 1280 ms) that this 
seems unlikely. The partial-copy model 
would also suggest that subjects would be 
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able to discriminate, for MOP-related tar- 
gets, which target went with which story, 
but Experiment 6 failed to find such dis- 
crimination. 
Another possible model would be a re- 
trieval model, in which two stories of the 
same MOP were encoded completely sepa- 
rately, with no connections from the stories 
to a generic MOP. The generic MOP would 
only be used to add information to the sep- 
arate encodings of the stories. If the MOP- 
related information in the stories was en- 
coded with an emphasis on its MOP- 
relatedness, then it might be the case that a 
MOP-related phrase from one of the stories 
would match information in both stories 
equally well. So there would be facilitation 
from MOP-related information in one of the 
stories to MOP-related information in the 
other story. Even though the stories were 
encoded completely separately, retrieval 
processes would produce matches that re- 
flected the MOP relations. But this model 
can be ruled out because there would still 
be the problem that additional facilitation 
would be expected between phrases in the 
same story. 
The partial copy model and the retrieval 
model exemplify the problems with most 
other models that might be considered: If 
explicitly stated story information is en- 
coded in some way both in a new structure 
representing the story and in the generic 
MOP, then a MOP-related prime from the 
same story as a MOP-related target should 
give more facilitation than a prime from a 
different story of the same MOP, and sub- 
jects should be able to discriminate which 
MOP-related targets belong to which sto- 
ries. On the other hand, if the information is 
encoded only in the new structure repre- 
senting the story and not in the generic 
MOP, then there should not be facilitation 
from phrases in the other story of the same 
MOP. To accommodate all the results with- 
out these problems, we propose a model in 
which encoding is extremely limited. 
According to the limited encoding model, 
no specific new structure is encoded for a 
story. Instead, MOP-related events are 
simply tagged in the generic MOP represen- 
tation. This representation is assumed to 
contain all the MOP-related events used in 
the stories. For example, in the Going to 
the beach MOP, after reading the two sto- 
ries shown in Table 1, the events in the ge- 
neric MOP that represent spread towel in a 
dry place, found an empty space for blan- 
ket, dove into water, and strolled into the 
ocean would all be tagged, because they are 
all actions that are in the generic MOP be- 
cause they frequently take place at the 
beach. Information in a story that was not 
related to the MOP would be encoded with 
pointers to the MOP-related information of 
the story. For example, watched the cliffs 
above for nesting swallows would be en- 
coded with pointers to found an empty 
space for blanket, as well as to other MOP- 
unrelated information. 
The result of encoding is that the MOP- 
related events are equally related to each 
other. While this would probably not be 
true for all sorts of MOP events (cf. Galam- 
bos & Rips, 1982), it is plausible for the 
events used in the experiments in this arti- 
cle. Both the blanket and towel actions are 
tagged in the generic MOP, and we assume 
they are equally related to strolling into the 
ocean in the generic MOP. Thus they facil- 
itate responses to strolling into the ocean 
equally well. MOP-unrelated targets are as- 
sociated only with other MOP-unrelated in- 
formation from the same story and with the 
generic MOP information that was stated in 
the same story, and so MOP-unrelated tar- 
gets are facilitated only by other phrases 
from the same story. 
The limited encoding model makes two 
strong assumptions. The first is that MOP- 
related information is simply tagged in the 
generic MOP and no new copy of the infor- 
mation is encoded. This assumption is not 
unreasonable. Real world constraints may 
require minimizing processing time and ef- 
fort. In addition, subjects in the experi- 
ments reported here soon realize that the 
stories are simple repetitions of sequences 
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of events that contain no surprises. Of 
course, for stories in which the actions 
were not so similar, there might be different 
scenes, MOPS, or scripts involved in the 
two stories, and so there might be better 
discrimination. 
The second strong assumption of the lim- 
ited encoding model is that the range of 
priming effects is limited. While two MOP- 
related phrases are closely associated 
enough to give facilitation to each other, 
one of them cannot give facilitation indi- 
rectly through the other to a MOP- 
unrelated phrase. The only MOP-related 
phrases that can give facilitation to MOP- 
unrelated phrases are those directly con- 
nected to the MOP-unrelated phrases by 
virtue of being in the same story. This as- 
sumption about the range of priming has 
empirical support from research with other 
kinds of associations. Ratcliff and McKoon 
(1988, Experiment 1) have shown that facil- 
itation does not extend through the range of 
propositions of a story but instead is found 
only among propositions connected closely 
together in memory. de Groot (1983) and 
Balota and Larch (1986) failed to find sig- 
nificant facilitation in lexical decision be- 
tween pairs of words like lion and stripes 
which were thought to be mediated by ti- 
ger. McNamara and Altarriba (1988) did 
find a small amount of facilitation when 
highly associated pairs of words were ex- 
cluded from the experiment, but this small 
effect can be attributed to a direct associa- 
tion (or feature overlap) between animals 
like lions and possible attributes of such an- 
imals’ appearances (McKoon & Ratcliff, 
1989e). 
The limited range of priming effects is 
one of the empirical phenomena that sup- 
ports a new view of priming proposed by 
Ratcliff and McKoon (1988; see also Mc- 
Koon & Ratcliff, 1988). According to this 
view, the facilitation given by a prime to a 
target is the result of the formation of a 
compound cue made up of the prime and 
target, and the joint strength of this com- 
pound in memory. In sharp contrast to 
spreading activation, this view does not as- 
sume that the prime activates some infor- 
mation in memory prior to the target. In- 
stead, priming effects reflect the contents 
of the compound cue in short-term mem- 
ory. Ratcliff and MdKoon (1988) have 
shown that this compound cue theory is 
consistent with the empirical phenomena 
associated with priming effects, and also 
with several current general theories of 
memory (Anderson, 1983; Gillund & Shif- 
frin, 1984; Hintzman, 1986; Murdock, 
1982). The theory is especially consistent 
with the data from the experiments in this 
article. Intuitively, the compound cue no- 
tion captures the associative strength of 
prime-target compounds made up of two 
MOP-related phrases and the strength of 
prime-target compounds made up of two 
phrases from the same story. Because there 
is no activation to “spread” through links 
among nodes in memory, there is no natural 
expectation of priming spreading from a 
MOP-related phrase of one story to a MOP- 
unrelated phrase of another story through 
generic MOP information. 
The results of the experiments presented 
in this article, based on MOP knowledge 
structures, stand in opposition to the previ- 
ous results obtained by Seifert et al. (1986; 
see also Seifert, Ableson & McKoon, 
1986), based on more general thematic 
structures. In the current experiments, a 
phrase from one story gave facilitation to a 
related phrase from another related story, 
but there was no such facilitation in the ex- 
periments in Seifert et al. The differences in 
results might be due to differences in the 
familiarity to the subjects of the generic 
structures (themes in Seifert et al. vs. 
MOPS in the current experiments). But it is 
more likely that the differences in results 
are due to the greater degree of content 
specificity in MOPS than in thematic struc- 
tures. Thematic structures specify only a 
pattern of actions rather than what the par- 
ticular actions might be; for example, the 
theme of revenge can be characterized by X 
doing something (unspecified) which is bad 
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for Y, and in response, Y does something 
(unspecified) which is bad for X (Lehnert, 
1981). In contrast, the MOP structures 
specify much more of the action sequence: 
in going to the beach, one puts something 
on the sand to lie on and goes in the water. 
Because MOPS specify particular actions 
that occur in a sequence, they include much 
more content specific knowledge than the- 
matic structures. It may be speculated that 
this specific concrete information is needed 
for two stories to be connected to the same 
generic structure in memory. 
This experimental investigation began 
with the issue of reminding, and the re- 
trieval of old, related episodes to help in the 
understanding and remembering of new ep- 
isodes. For a story used in the experiments 
in this article, the most similar general 
structure in memory would be the story’s 
MOP and the experimental results show 
that the story is encoded in terms of the 
MOP. However, the most similar specific 
structure in memory ought to have been the 
previously read story of that same struc- 
ture, but the results do not support the en- 
coding of story to story connections. It ap- 
pears that events in one of the stories are 
not directly connected to events in the 
other story. Evidence for such connections 
has been obtained only when subjects are 
explicitly asked to rate the similarity of 
pairs of stories (Seifert et al., 1986). 
The experiments reported here show that 
MOP episodes are encoded with respect to 
shared knowledge structures. Although 
previous research has demonstrated the 
role of such generic knowledge structures 
in retrieval (cf. Alba & Hasher, 1983), the 
experiments in this article are the first to 
show the role of such structures in the en- 
coding of new information. We view this 
research as one step in the examination of 
the complexities of the interactions of text 
processing and knowledge organization. In 
this way, the research has implications for 
the investigation of semantic memory, 
which despite extensive study a few years 
ago (cf. Collins & Loftus, 1975; Smith, 
Shoben, & Rips, 1974; Ratcliff & McKoon, 
1982) has received little attention recently. 
We believe that investigating the character- 
istics of memory for general knowledge 
through interactions with text processing is 
a fruitful direction for research. Schank’s 
(1982) theory of the use of larger, high level 
structures to encode and retrieve episodes 
is a potential route to progress, and the ex- 
periments reported use that theory to ex- 
amine generic knowledge structures. 
Whether or not one subscribes to the the- 
ory, it provides a framework for formulat- 
ing and addressing empirical questions 
about higher level knowledge structures. 
APPENDIX 
MOP-related Primes, MOP-related 
Targets, and MOP-unrelated Targets 
MOP 1, Story 1 
spread her towel in a dry place. 
dove into the refreshing water. 
enjoyed the power of her executive secretary posi- 
tion. 
MOP 1, Story 2 
found an empty space for her blanket. 
slowly strolled out into the cool ocean. 
watched the cliffs above her for nesting swallows. 
MOP 2, Story 1 
were greeted at the door upon arriving. 
had chocolate mousse for dessert. 
pager indicated he was urgently needed. 
MOP 2, Story 2 
were shown to the cloakroom after entering. 
finished with creme caramel. 
wanted to make a good impression by chatting. 
MOP 3, Story 1 
let his co-workers know the details. 
sat back and listened for the doorbell. 
planned strategy for next week’s business meeting. 
MOP 3, Story 2 
told his friends the date and time. 
paced around, anxious to greet his guests. 
favorite clothes were in the laundry. 
MOP 4, Story 1 
caught the bus to the shopping district. 
used a Mastercard to purchase shoes. 
saw a good friend across the street. 
MOP 4, Story 2 
got a ride from a classmate after school. 
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paid for the new sneakers by check. 
was coming down with a cold. 
MOP 11, Story 1 
sprayed the car all over with water. 
MOP 5, Story 1 
was told the plane would be leaving on schedule. 
sat down and buckled the safety strap. 
was scheduled to give a speech. 
MOP 5, Story 2 
saw the departure time on the flight listings. 
settled in and fastened the seat belt. 
spent the next hour anticipating the dinner menu. 
put the car back into the garage. 
would have preferred a long vacation. 
MOP 11, Story 2 
started hosing the car down. 
parked the car along side of the house. 
found a pair of socks that matched. 
MOP 12, Story 1 
finished making the deviled egg sandwiches. 
folded up the old tablecloth. 
rang the doorbell and found no one was at home. MOP 6, Story 1 pulled himself out of bed. 
bounded downstairs for a large breakfast. 
grabbed the flimsy wooden handrail, but it cracked. 
MOP 6, Story 2 
stretched and slowly got up. 
jogged off into the kitchen. 
had forgotten to park his convertible in the garage. 
MOP 7, Story 1 
finally found a spot to park. 
carried his sleeping son out to the lot. 
had caused quite a traffic jam in the parking lot. 
MOP 7, Story 2 
drove into the last empty space near the exit. 
headed for home, cheering wildly. 
suggested to the group that they get some coffee. 
MOP 8, Story 1 
sat down because there were people ahead. 
examined the end product in the mirror. 
learned his trade in Germany many years ago. 
MOP 8, Story 2 
read the latest edition of “Harper’s Bazaar.” 
looked at the hairstyle from every angle. 
was extremely allergic to aerosols and anxious to get 
outside. 
MOP 9, Story 1 
walked up to the small counter. 
checked that the transaction had been recorded. 
looked forward to having a high paying job. 
MOP 9, Story 2 
went over to the oak veneer desk. 
examined the deposit receipt for errors. 
tried to be pleasant while doing her work. 
MOP 10, Story 1 
wrote about being thrilled with the present. 
carefully placed the loving note in the mailbox. 
was recovering from a stroke at a convalescent 
home. 
MOP 10, Story 2 
detailed the new experiences at school. 
dropped the letter at the post office. 
had to hurry across campus to the lecture hall. 
MOP 12, Story 2 
spent the morning preparing lunch. 
picked up the blanket and food basket. 
turned the radio up so everyone could hear. 
MOP 13, Story 1 
ran streamers across the ceiling. 
passed cake to the hungry guests. 
fell off and skinned his knees. 
MOP 13, Story 2 
confetti flew as the crowd began to show up, 
everyone at the party ate happily. 
couldn’t get home for the party. 
MOP 14, Story 1 
the short ceremony ended with a kiss. 
threw the bouquet in a friend’s direction. 
tripped while carrying a tray loaded with cham 
pagne 
MOP 14, Story 2 
embraced the bride and proceeded out. 
tossed the flowers to the girls. 
had been working hard all day. 
MOP 15, Story 1 
loaded a huge tree into the pick-up. 
strung the bulbs through the tree. 
started a fight with his sister. 
MOP 15, Story 2 
tied a Norway Pine on the station wagon. 
carefully draped some lights on each bough. 
came to this country as a young girl. 
MOP 16, Story 1 
drove around the huge lot to find a spot. 
trooped to the concession stand. 
wanted milkshakes and bags of popcorn. 
MOP 16, Story 2 
had to search to get a good location to see. 
walked to the refreshment building. 
lots of teenagers were hanging around. 
MOP 17, Story 1 
answered some questions about travel plans. 
carefully checked the ticket over. 
rummaged through her purse for some kleenex. 
MOP 17, Story 2 ing-activation theory of semantic processing. Psy- 
discussed flexibility with schedules. chological Review, 82, 407-428. 
looked over the final itinerary. DE GROOT, A. M. B. (1983). The range of automatic 
looked at her watch, hoping it was time for lunch. spreading activation in word priming. Journal of 
MOP 18, Story 1 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 22, 417- 
remembered to floss carefully. 436. 
was snoring contentedly in less than five minutes. DYER, M. G. (1983). In-depth understanding: A com- 
romped into the room, fighting and scratching. puter model of integrated processing for narrative comprehension. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
MOP 18, Story 2 FELDMAN, J. (1975). Bad-mouthing frames. In R. C. 
walked down the hall to brush teeth. Schank & B. Nash-Webber (Eds.), Theoretical is- 
was soon fast asleep under the covers. sues in natural language processing. Cambridge, 
called from school to ask for an emergency loan. MA: Bolt, Beranek, & Newman. 
MOP 19, Story 1 GALAMBOS, J., & UPS, L. (1982). Memory for rou- 
got Dad to drive to the movie house. tines. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Be- 
settled in for an enjoyable two hours. havior, 21, 260-281. 
paced angrily as he waited for help. GILLUND, G., & SHIFFRIN, R. M. (1984). A retrieval model for both recognition and recall. Psycholog- 
MOP 19, Story 2 ical Review, 19, l-65. 
was driven to the theater by an older brother. HINTZMAN, D. (1986). “Schema abstraction” in a 
enthusiastically waited for the movie to begin. multiple-trace memory model. Psychological Re- 
thought he smelled smoke out in the lobby. view, 93, 41 l-428. 
MOP 20, Story 1 LEHNERT, W. G. (1981). Plot units and narrative sum- 
sat next to an old friend. marization. Cognitive Science, 5, 293-33 1. 
closed the notebook when the lecture ended. MCKOON, G., & RATCLIFF, R. (1981). The compre- 
slipped out quietly through the side entrance. hension processes and memory structures in- volved in instrumental inference. Journal of Ver- 
MOP 20, Story 2 bal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20, 671-682. 
took a seat that afforded a good view. MCKOON, G., & RATCLIFF, R. (1986). Inferences 
packed up when the presentation was over. about predictable events. Journal of Experimental 
were working hard to fix the air conditioner. Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
MOP 21, Story 1 12, 82-91. 
parked the car at MacDonald’s and went inside. MCKOON, G., & RATCLIFF, R. (1988). Contextually 
threw out the garbage after finishing everything. relevant aspects of meaning. Journal of Experi- 
got out to haul away a car. mental Psychology: Learning, Memory. and Cog- 
nition, 14, 331-343. 
MOP 21, Story 2 
pulled up to a Burger King that was open. 
MCKOON, G., & RATCLIFF, R. (1989a). Semantic as- 
bussed the tray after the food was gone. 
sociation and elaborative inference. Journal of Ex- 
could think of only one thing; driving the new car. 
perimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 15, 326338. 
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